In this paper, we introduce a game theoretic framework for studying the problem of minimizing the completion time of instantly decodable network coding (IDNC) for cooperative data exchange (CDE) in decentralized wireless network. In this configuration, clients cooperate with each other to recover the erased packets without a central controller. Game theory is employed herein as a tool for improving the distributed solution by overcoming the need for a central controller or additional signaling in the system. We model the session by self-interested players in a non-cooperative potential game. The utility function is designed such that increasing individual payoff results in a collective behavior achieving both a desirable system performance in a shared network environment and the Pareto optimal solution. We further show that our distributed solution achieves the centralized solution. Through extensive simulations, our approach is compared to the best performance that could be found in the conventional point-to-multipoint (PMP) recovery process. Numerical results show that our formulation largely outperforms the conventional PMP scheme in most practical situations and achieves a lower delay.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Network Coding
Since its introduction in [2] , NC was shown to be a promising technique to significantly improve the throughput and delays of packet recovery especially in wireless erasure networks, due to the broadcast nature of their transmissions. These merits are essential for real time applications requiring reliable transmissions and fast recovery over erasure channels, such as multimedia streaming [3] .
Two important classes of NC for such applications can be distinguished in the literature: the Random Network Coding (RNC) [4] , [5] and the Opportunistic Network Coding (ONC) [6] , [7] . RNC is implemented by combining packets with independent, random and non zero coefficients [4] . Despite its attractive benefits such as optimality in number of transmissions for broadcast applications and ability to recover even More explanations and details along with proofs are provided in the technical report [1] without feedback [5] , RNC is not suitable for the applications of our interest since it does not allow progressive decoding of the frame, is not optimal for multipoint to multipoint communications (multicast) and require expensive computation at the clients to decode the frame. In ONC, packet combinations are selected according to the received/lost packet state of each client [7] . ONC was show to be a graceful solution for packet recovery for wireless network [8] .
One ONC subclass that suits most of the aforementioned application is the instantly decodable network coding (IDNC) since it provides instant and progressive decoding of packets. IDNC can be implemented using binary XOR to encode and decode packets. Furthermore, no buffer is needed at the clients to store non instantly decodable packets for future decoding possibilities. Thanks to its merits, IDNC was an intensive subject of research [3] , [9] - [22] . In [23] , the authors studied the problem of minimizing the completion time in IDNC. The completion time was proofed to be related to the decoding delay in [24] and can be better controlled with it.
B. Motivation and Related Work
In all aforementioned works, the base station of a point-tomultipoint network (such as cellular, Wi-Fi and WiMAX and roadside to vehicle networks) was assumed to be responsible for the recovery of erased packets. This can pose a threat on the resources of such base stations and their abilities to deliver the required huge data rates especially in future wireless standards. This problem becomes more severe in roadside to vehicle networks since the vehicles usually bypass the roadside senders very fast and thus cannot rely on it for packet recovery but rather on completing the missing packets among themselves. One alternative to this problem is the notion of cooperative data exchange (CDE) introduced in [25] . In this configuration, clients can cooperate to exchange data by sending IDNC recovery packets to each other over short range and more reliable communication channels, thus allowing the base station to serve other clients. This CDE model is also important for fast and reliable data communications over ad-hoc networks, such vehicular and sensor networks. Consequently, it is very important to study the minimization of delays and number of transmissions in such IDNC-based CDE systems.
Unlike conventional point-to-multipoint scenario, the IDNC based CDE systems require not only decisions on packet combinations but also on which client to send in every transmission in order to achieve a certain quality for one of the network metrics. Recently Aboutorab and al. [17] considered the problem of minimizing the sum decoding delay for CDE in a centralized fashion. By centralized, we mean that a central unit (such as the base station in the cellular example) takes the decisions on which client to send which packet combination in each transmission.
C. Contributions
In this paper, we introduce a game theoretic framework for studying the problem of minimizing the completion time of instantly decodable network coding for cooperative data exchange in decentralized wireless network. The problem is modeled as cooperative control problem using game theory as a tool for improving the distributed solution by overcoming the need for a central controller or additional signaling in the system.
Cooperative control problems entail numerous autonomous players seeking to collectively achieve a global objective. The network coding problem is one example of a cooperative control problems, in which the global objective is for all players to efficiently use a common resource by opportunistically taking advantage of the possible coding occasions. The central challenge in cooperative control problems is to derive a local control mechanism for the individual players such that the players operate in a manner that collectively serves the desired global objective.
In this paper, we derive expressions for the individual utility functions in such way that increasing individual payoff results in a collective behavior achieving a desirable system performance in a shared network environment. We then improve the game formulation to include punishment policy and reduce the set of equilibrium to the one dimensional line containing the Pareto optimal solution of our interest. To the best of our knowledge, using game theory tools to model IDNC-based CDE has not been addressed in the literature and only heuristic algorithm were proposed to solve the problem in a centralized fashion [17] . Moreover, this work can serve as a background to build more complicated system in which the feedback or the players state are not available.
For clarity purposes, the notation X refers to a matrix whose ith column is X i . The notation x refers to a vector whose ith entry is x i . We denote by {0, 1} x×y the set of matrices of dimension x × y containing only 0s and 1s. We also use the notation {0, 1} x to refer to the set {0, 1} x×1 . The notation [X 1 , ..., X n ] refers to the matrix whose ith column is the vector X i and the notation X = [x ij ] refers to a matrix X whose ith row and j column is the element x ij The rest of this paper is divided as follows: In Section II, we present our network model and protocol. The game pa-rameters, and formulation are presented in Section III. The punishment policy and the new game formulation are provided in Section IV. In Section V, we present the algorithm used to simulate the system. Before concluding in Section VII, simulations results are illustrated in Section VI.
II. NETWORK MODEL AND PROTOCOL
A. Network Model
The network we consider in this paper consists of a set M = {1, ..., M } geographically close clients (players) that require the reception of source packets that the base station (BS) holds. Each player is interested in receiving the frame N = {1, ..., N } of source packets regardless of the order.
In the first n time slots, the BS broadcasts the N source packets of the frame N uncoded. Each player i is experiencing a packet erasure probability q i assumed to be constant during this phase. Each player listens to the transmitted packets and sends an acknowledgement (ACK) upon each successful reception of each packet. We assume that at the end of this initial phase, each packet of the frame is at least acknowledged by one of the players. Otherwise, this packet is re-transmitted by the BS.
After this initialization phase, for each player i, the packets of the frame N can be in one of the following sets:
• The Has set (denoted by H i ): The sets of packets successfully received by player i. • The Wants set (denoted by W i ): The sets of packets that were erased at player i. Clearly, we have W i = N \ H i . In this configuration, we assume a perfect reception of the acknowledgement by all the players and that each player knows the packets sets of all the other players. Each player stores the information obtained after the transmission at time
B. Network Protocol
After the initial transmission, the recovery phase starts. In this phase, the players cooperate to recover their missing packets by transmitting to each other binary XOR encoded packets of the source packets they already hold in order to minimize the completion time.
The packet combination is chosen according to the available packets they have, the information available in the SM and the expected erasure patterns of the links. Let P = [p ij ], i, j ∈ M denote the packet erasure probability (i.e. the probability to loss a packet) from player j to player i. All the packet erasure probabilities are assumed to be constant during the transmission of the frame. Since the packet erasure probability depends not only on the link but also on the available power used to transmit, therefore p ij can be different from p ji . We assume that each player knows all the packet erasure probabilities linking him to other players (i.e. player i knows p ji , ∀ j ∈ N ) and that each transmission can be heard by all the players. Therefore only one player will transmit a packet combination at each time slot. Otherwise, due to interference between transmissions, none of the players will be able to decode a packet.
In this phase, the transmitted coded packets can be one of the following three options for each player i:
• Instantly Decodable: A packet is instantly decodable for player i if the encoded packet contain at most one packet the player does not have so far. In other words, it contains only one packet from W i . • Non-Instantly Decodable: A packet is non instantly decodable for player i if it contains more than one packet missing for that player. In other words, it contains at least two packets from W i . • Non-innovative: A packet is non-innovative for player i if it do not allow him to reduce its Wants set. In other words, it does not contains packets from W i . We define the conventional decoding delay [9] , [26] as follows:
Definition 1. At any cooperative phase transmission, a player i, with non-empty Wants set, experiences a one unit increase of decoding delay if it successfully receivers a packet that is either non-innovative or non-instantly decodable.
The cooperation decoding delay can be defined as:
Definition 2. At any cooperative phase transmission, a player i, with non-empty Wants set, experiences a one unit increase of decoding delay if not exactly one player transmitted or only one player transmitted and its conventional decoding delay increases.
In other words, if more than one or none players transmits, all the players will experience a decoding delay and if player i is the only transmitting player, he will experience a delay along with all players that successfully received a packet that is either non-innovative or non-instantly decodable. In the rest of the paper, we will use the term decoding delay to refer to the cooperative decoding delay. We define the targeted players by a transmission as the players that can instantly decode a packet from that transmission. After each transmission in the recovery phase, its targeted players send acknowledgements consisting of one bit indicating the successful reception. This process is repeated until all players report that they obtained all the packets.
Since we assume single hop transmissions, which means that all the players are in the transmission range of each other, each of them can already overhear all the feedback sent by the other players and thus the system does not require any additional feedback load.
C. Definitions and Notation
We define a finite stochastic non-cooperative game, like in [27] , with a common state by the 6-uplet:
where:
• {A i } i is the set of all possible actions during the course of the game, • Ω is the set of possible states of the game, • A i (ω) is the set of possible action for player i in the state w ∈ Ω of the game, • α i : Ω −→ 2 Ai is the correspondence determining the possible actions at a given state of a game, • q t is the conditional distribution of the transition probability from state to state. For independent states games, q is the distribution over the set Ω and can be ignored in the definition of the game. Otherwise the game is called competitive Markov decision process [28] , • U i is the utility function of player i, which will be defined further in the paper. Let ω(t) ∈ Ω be the state of the game at the stage t. For notation simplicity, the set of actions of player i at stage t will be denoted by
be the set of all possible actions that can be taken by all the players at the stage t of the game.
For an action profile a t = (a 1 (t), ..., a M (t)) T ∈ A(t), let a t,−i denote the profile of players other than player i. In other words, a t,−i = (a 1 (t), ..., a i−1 (t), a i+1 (t), ...a M (t)) T . The subscript T denote the transpose operator. We can write a profile a t of actions as (a t,i , a t,−i ). Similarly, the notation
A j (t) refers to the set of possible actions of all the player other than player i at stage t of the game. Let h t = (ω(1), a(1), ..., a(t − 1), ω(t)) T be the history of the game at stage t that lies in the set:
Let U i be utility function for player i. We may write U i (a t , h t ) as U i (a t,i , a t,−i , h t ). The game G is said to be finite if the number of times it is played is finite. For such games, let T be the final stage of the game. The definition of T can be written as:
III. COMPLETION TIME GAME FORMULATION
In this section, we first introduce the game parameter to be able to model the problem of minimizing the completion time in IDNC as a non-cooperative potential game. We then provide the expression of the utility for the game.
A. Game Parameters
Let κ i (t) be the optimal packet combination that player i can generate at the stage t of the game. We have κ i (t) ∈ {0, 1} N with κ i j (t) = 1 means that packet j is included in the packet combination and 0 otherwise. The mathematical expression of this combination can be found in [24] . Since the SM is known by all players, therefore each player can compute the optimal packet combination (or a sub-optimal since the computation of the optimal was shown to be NPhard) of all the other players.
In this game formulation, we assume complete and perfect information. The former assumption means that the actions available to the players and the utility functions are common knowledge i.e. every player knows the data of the game, every player knows that the other players know the data of the game, every player knows that every player knows that every players knows the data of the game, and so on, ad infinitum. The latter assumption means that all the players know the history of the game perfectly. Note that these assumptions do not add extra constraints to the problem but are rather intrinsic to it.
At each stage of the game, each player has two possible actions: either he transmits or he listens. Therefore, we define the action space of player i at each stage t of the game as A i (t) = {transmit κ i (t), remain silent}. Note that the action space of the players are not symmetric since each player can transmit a different packet combination at each stage. Let a t be the actions taken by all the users at the stage t. For simplicity of notation, we will define a t as the following: a t :
The set of targeted players by a packet combination are those that can instantly decode an innovative packet from the combination. Let τ κ(t) be the set of targeted player by the packet combination κ at the stage t of the game. The mathematical definition of this set is given by:
The players that experience a conventional decoding delay after a transmission are those with non-empty Wants set and are not targeted by the transmission. Define τ κ(t) = 1 − τ κ(t) as the set of non targeted players and let M w (t) be the set of players with non-empty Wants set defined as follows:
The state ω of the game is the erasure patterns of the links between each couple of players. These states can be described by the following formula:
where X ij is a Bernoulli random variable defined as follows:
The X ij are independent of each other and therefore the ω(t) are independent identically distributed (iid). The game can be seen as a random matrix game. We now can compute the decoding delay D w,κ experienced by all the users when user i sends the packet combination κ at the stage t using the following expression:
where • is the Hadamard product. We also define the cumulative decoding delay experienced by all players since the beginning of the recovery phase (beginning of the game) until the stage t of the game:
otherwise with i such that a i (t) = ||a t || 1 .
(14)
In the case of the Point to Multipoint (PMP) recovery process (when only the base station is transmitting), the completion time C i can be approximated [24] by the following expression:
Since in the CDE, all users may be transmitting to each other, then the completion time can be approximated by:
where p i is the average erasure probability linking the player i to the other players. This average erasure probability can be expressed in terms of the erasure matrix as follows: p i = ||P i || 1 M . Let C be the vector of the completion times, W the vector of the Wants sets and p the one of the average erasures. Therefore, we define the expected completion time of each player as follows:
where the operator x./y refers to the division of each element of vector x by the element of vector y.
B. Utility Functions
In this first formulation, we take the cost (-utility) function to be the natural delay in the network.
Game 1 (Completion time Game):
• Players: Users in set M • History : h t = Channel realization ω(t) and players' action a t at each stage t ≥ 1. • Strategies: Contingency plans for selection transmission policy at each stage t ≥ 1 and for any given history h t . • Utilities: U CT i for each player i, where at each stage t ≥ 1 and for any given history h t and action profile a t :
This game formulation is a non-cooperative stochastic potential game. However, this definition of the game suffers from many flaws. First, by inspection of the Nash equilibrium (NE) of the game (Appendix A in [1] ), we clearly can see that most of the NE yield the worst payoff. This occurs when more than one player is transmitting. Without a punishment policy, the game can loop infinitely without reducing the Wants set of any player. Secondly, this multitude of NE will not make the system work in its best point which is the Pareto Optimal Nash equilibrium (PONE). For these reasons, the overall performance of the game will be very poor and a more robust definition of the game must be addressed.
IV. PUNISHMENT AND PARETO OPTIMALITY
A. Punishment and Back-off Function
In the first definition of the game, after a collision occurs, each of the players that transmitted can re-transmit in the next stage of the game. In order to overcome the scenario in which multiple consecutive collisions occur, we impose a punishment period of V to every player responsible of a collision. In other words, players responsible of a collision will back-off and will not be able to transmit during the next V transmissions. Let c t = (c 1 (t), ..., c M (t)) T ∈ {0, 1} M be the collision indicator defined as follows:
Let C be the collision history over the last V stage of the game. The mathematical definition of this variable is:
For notation consistency, the collision indicator for a non positive time index is taken 0 i.e. c −t = 0, ∀ t ≥ 0. The back-off function indicates at each stage t of the game which players are allowed to transmit. The mathematical definition of this function is:
Let A ′ i (t) be the action space of player i at each stage t of the game defined as follows:
B. New Game Formulation
In order to encourage sparsity of the action profile vector a t , the ℓ 1 regularizer is added to the previous definition of the utility function. Moreover, prioritization between players is added when all action profiles will yield a higher expected completion time than in the previous stage of the game. This additional term is scaled by the number of player to not change the original game. The new game formulation is: Game 2 (New completion time Game):
• Players: Users in set M • History : h t = Channel realization ω(t) and players' action a t at each stage t ≥ 1. • Strategies: Contingency plans for selection of a transmission policy at each stage t ≥ 1 and for any given history h t .
• Utilities: U CT i for each player i, where at each stage t ≥ 1 and for any given history h t and action profile a t :
As for Game 1, Game 2 is a non-cooperative stochastic potential games. In the next section of the game, we will proof that this formulation effectively addresses the concerns of the first version.
V. DISTRIBUTED LEARNING ALGORITHM
By investigation of the Price-Of-Anarchy of the two versions of the games (Appendix A for version 1 and Appendix B for version 2 in [1] ), the new definition of the game offers a more efficient equilibrium. Therefore, for any learning algorithm and a long running period, Game 2 will performs better in terms of delay than Game 1.
In this paper, we will employ the best-response algorithm to simulate the system. In the original formulation, by Cournot [29] , players choose their actions sequentially. At each time slot, a player selects the action that is the best response to the action chosen by the other players in the previous time slot. Since the state of the game is not known to players, the utility function will be replaced by the expected utility function. This can be done by replacing the actual state ω i (t) by its expected value P i (t) in (12) . The following theorem characterize the outcome of the best-response algorithm for our games: Theorem 1. For the second version of the game, the bestresponse algorithm will make the system operate in the PONE of the game.
Proof: To proof this theorem, we fist introduce the following theorem: Theorem 2. Let G be a best-reply potential game with V a best response potential. If the action a * t maximizes V, then a * t is a NE.
Proof: The proof of this theorem can be found in [30] .
From our analysis in [1] , the NE of the second game are located on the one dimensional line in which only one player is transmitting. Let a * t be the PONE of the game such that ||a * t || 1 = a i (t) = 1. Assume that the outcome of the bestresponse algorithm is the action profile a ′ t = a * t . In virtue of Theorem 2 and our previous analysis, the action profile will have ||a ′ t || 1 = a j (t) = 1, j = i. For simplicity, assume that players take action sequentially in order. Assume first that j < i i.e. player j will take action before player i. Therefore, player j did not take its best-response game because he can insure better payoff by choosing not to transmit. Hence, we obtain j ≥ i. Assume now j > i. Since player i is taken its best action then it will transmit. According to theorem 2 player j is unable to transmit otherwise the outcome will not be a NE of the game. Therefore we obtain i = j. In other words, the only outcome of the best-response algorithm is the PONE of the game. In other words, the outcome in the solution to the centralized CDE.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we first present the simulation results comparing the delay encountered by players when applying the PMP system [24] against the distributed non decentralized cooperative data exchange. We, then, compare the delay experienced by clients against the player-player packet erasure probability relatively to the base station-player packet erasure probability since the short range communications are more reliable than the base station-player communications [17] , [25] .
In these simulations, the delay is computed over a large number of iterations and the average value is presented. We assume that the packet erasure probability remains constant during a delivery period and changes from iteration to iteration while keeping its mean, P of the player-player and Q for the base BS-players, constant. We also assume that each player has perfect knowledge of the packet erasure probabilities linking him to the other player (i.e. the estimation of this probability is perfect). Figure 1 depicts the comparison of the average completion time achieved by the PMP scheme and our distributed CDE scheme against the number of players M for N = 30, Q = 0.2, and P = 0.1. Figure 2 presents the mean completion time against the ratio of the player-player and BS-player erasure probability P/Q for M = 60, N = 30, and Q = 0.3.
From all the figures, we can clearly see that our cooperative data exchange algorithms outperform the traditional PMP approach. Figure 1, illustrates the gain in using a distributed algorithm when the player-player channel conditions is better than the BS-player channel (P = 0.5Q). Figure 2 illustrates the mean completion time against the player-player erasure probability for a fixed BS-player erasure. In this configuration, for the same erasure probability, the PMP scheme outperform the distributed approach. This can be explained first by the fact that the BS has all the packets whereas any one player has only a subset and thus, in general, the BS has better ability to form coding combinations that target more players than any single player. It can also be explained by the fact that in our CDE approach, the approximation of the completion time using the decoding delay approach requires the erasure probability between the sender in large sense and the player. For the PMP scheme only the base station is transmitting and therefore this probability is fixed (from BS to players). However in the CDE scheme, all players can transmit and we approximate the probability by the average erasure linking each player to all the other players. This approximation degrades the scheme. However as the channel linking players become better, CDE starts to outperform even if players send less efficient coding combinations and we clearly can see the difference between our scheme and the PMP one.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES
In this paper, we formulated the problem of minimizing the completion time of instantly decodable network coding for cooperative data exchange in decentralized wireless network as cooperative control game. We employed game theory as a tool to improve the distributed solution by overcoming the need for a central controller or additional signaling in the system. We modeled the session by self-interested players in a non-cooperative potential game. The utility functions is designed in such way that increasing individual payoff results in a collective behavior achieving both a desirable system performance and the Pareto optimal solution. We showed that our distributed solution achieves the centralized solution. We compared our approach to the one of the conventional point-tomultipoint recovery process. Numerical results showed that our formulation largely outperforms the conventional PMP scheme in most practical scenarios and achieved a lower delay. The advantage of this formulation is that it can be easily extended. For example, this formulation can be extended to the case where not all the players are in the range of each other. In other words, the utility function will not be completely defined for the players. Another interesting research direction is the multicast cast with limited range. In this scenario, the packet demand of each player can differ and players are not all in the transmission range of each other. Finally, the case of imperfect feedback is another important and more practical extension.
